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Lipton: Lipton: Arbitration in the Securities Industry:

ARBITRATION IN THE SECURITIES
INDUSTRY: TOO MUCH OF A GOOD
THING?*
PROFESSOR DAVID

I.

A.

LIPTON**

PREFACE

The study upon which this article is based was conducted in response to
the explosive growth of the use of arbitration in the securities industry as a
means of resolving broker/customer disputes. The study was designed to investigate whether the use that is being made of arbitration is efficient and, if
inefficiencies were found, what procedures might be employed to screen out
inefficient use.
This article was completed prior to the Supreme Court's recent resolution
of the Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd case.1 In light of that decision, it
now appears likely that the concerns raised in the article will become even
more significant.
In the past three decades, customers who were involved in disputes with
their brokers arising out of alleged violations of the federal securities acts
could circumvent pre-dispute contractual commitments made with their brokers to bring their conflicts to arbitration by invoking the principles ennunciated in the Wilko v. Swan decision.' In that watershed case, the U.S.
Supreme Court ruled that the customer protections provided by the 1933 Securities Act, including the ability to seek judicial enforcement of these protections, cannot be overridden by pre-dispute contracts committing customers to
resolve conflicts in arbitration. The reasoning in Wilko was also applied to
disputes arising under the 1934 Securities Exchange Act.' Customers often
* The study upon which this article is based was funded by a research grant
from the National Institute for Dispute Resolution and a matching grant from the
School of Law of the Catholic University of America.
**
Associate Professor of Law, Catholic University of America, Columbus
School of Law; B.A., Cornell University, 1966; M.A., Columbia University, 1968; J.D.,
University of Michigan, 1972. Professor Lipton serves as an arbitrator for the New
York Stock Exchange, the National Association of Securities Dealers, and the American Arbitration Association. The author wishes to express his appreciation for the data
processing assistance provided by his former research assistant, William Conyngham,
now an attorney in Washington.
I. Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 105 S. Ct. 1238 (1985).
2. Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
3. Weissbuch v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 558 F.2d 831
(7th Cir. 1977); Laupheimer v. McDonnell & Co., 500 F.2d 21 (2d Cir. 1974); Reader
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prefer litigation over arbitration because of the perceived advantages of avoiding an industry arbitration panel, utilizing discovery rules provided in litigation, and obtaining in litigation an award of attorney fees. Wilko gave customers the right to bring their disputes to litigation, even if the customer had
bound itself prior to the dispute to arbitration so long as a federal securities
act cause of action was at issue.
In order to insure that the Wilko rule would provide the perceived benefits of litigation to a particular dispute with a broker, plaintiff customers would
frequently include claims of federal securities acts violations along with claims
that were based solely upon state common law. When these mixed claims were
brought to litigation, several circuits permitted the state claims to be afforded
the same advantages afforded the federal securities acts claims and thus to be
adjudicated." This practice came to be known as "intertwining."
What Dean Witter Reynolds has done quite simply is to put an end to the
intertwining doctrine. Thus, customer/broker disputes involving both state
claims as well as federal securities acts claims will, after Dean Witter Reynolds, be bi-furcated. The number of cases that will be affected is unclear. It is
certain, however, that this decision will substantially increase the number of
matters to be resolved by an arbitration system which has already recently
experienced dramatic growth.
In addition, a concurring opinion by Justice White in the Dean Witter
Reynolds case raised the specter that the Wilko rule will no longer be
mechanically applied to issues arising under the 1934 Securities Exchange
Act.' Since most customer broker disputes arise under the 1934 Act, Justice
White's reservations regarding Wilko suggest the possibility of an even further
expanded arbitration case load.
These increases, both actual and potential, in the matters going to arbitration, add further importance to the questions raised in the study. Is efficient
use presently being made of the arbitration system? Are there mechanisms
available to provide increased efficiencies? This article will explore these
questions.

v. Hirsch & Co., 197 F. Supp. 11l (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
4. Belke v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 693 F.2d 1023 (11 th
Cir. 1982); Miley v. Oppenheimer & Co., 637 F.2d 318 (5th Cir. 1981); C. F. Dickinson v. Heinnold Securities, Inc., 661 F.2d 638 (7th Cir. 1981).
5. Justice White noted several distinctions between the claim brought in Wilko
as opposed to claims brought under the 1934 Act. Most significantly, the Wilko case
was based upon an express remedy provided by Section 12(2) of the 1933 Act. 15
U.S.C.S. §77o(2) (1984). Cases brought under the 1934 Act rely upon an implied
remedy, not expressly found in the 1934 Act, but rather interpreted to arise under
Section 10(b). 15 U.S.C.S. §78j(b) (1984).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol1985/iss/10
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1I.

STUDY GOALS

Any enumeration of the advantages of arbitration as a mechanism of dispute resolution should include a reference to its cost effectiveness and expediency. Arbitration of customer/broker disputes in the securities industry is typically perceived as possessing these advantages for both the customer and the
broker.6 One could also posit that, on a macro level, an arbitration system is
advantageous to the securities industry since it is perceived as redressing
wrongs and thus promotes customer (investor) confidence in the fairness of the
7
securities industry.
As with other dispute resolution systems, there are direct costs associated
with providing the desirable benefits of cost-effectiveness, expediency and investor confidence. In the securities industry, the costs of providing for and participating in the dispute resolution mechanism are absorbed by the self-regulatory organizations (the exchanges and the National Association of Securities
Dealers) which organized the arbitration system and the parties (the brokers
and the customers) who seek resolution of their disputes within the arbitration
system. Ultimately, the costs absorbed by the self-regulatory organizations
(SRO's) are passed on to member firms who either absorb the costs or pass
them on to their customers.
As the costs for operating the securities industry's dispute resolution system rise, the affected parties-the SRO's, the member firms, and the investing
public or its representatives-may begin to explore whether the same benefits
associated with the present arbitration system can be achieved at a lesser cost.
One approach to reducing the costs of arbitration is to investigate the possibility that unnecessary use is being made of the arbitration mechanism. Is the
arbitration mechanism being utilized by disputants who might be capable of
resolving their disputes by means which are less costly than arbitration, but
6. In encouraging the process that ultimately led to the adoption of a Uniform
Code of Arbitration by the national securities exchanges and the National Association
of Securities Dealers, the Securities and Exchange Commission (the "Commission")
spoke of investors' needs for resolving claims "quickly" and with "minimum expense to
both the industry and the investor." Securities Exchange Act Rel. No. 12974 (November 15, 1976). On another occasion, the Commission identified its motivation in stimulating the adoption of Uniform Code of Arbitration as evolving from a "concern that
there be more effective, efficient, and economical dispute resolution procedures available to individual investors." Securities Exchange Act Rel. No. 13470 (April 26, 1977).
7. The Commission's Office of Consumer Affairs, pursuant to a Commission
directive, prepared a report in 1976 discussing the need for revisions to the then current
industry dispute resolution system and making suggestions for accomplishing these revisions. The report that the Office prepared was the basis for the Commission's support
for the creation and adoption of the Uniform Code of Arbitration for the securities
industry. The summary of the report anticipated that the proposed system would "encourage the individual investor to participate in the securities markets." Securities Exchange Act Rel. No. 12974 (November 15, 1976).
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which provide equally satisfactory results? That is, is arbitration being used
inefficiently?"
Arbitration might be used inefficiently for numerous reasons. In some instances, arbitration might be used because a less expensive resolution mechanism is not offered or is not readily available. At other times, it may be because the party engaging the arbitration mechanism is unaware that his
dispute could be resolved more efficiently. If arbitration is being used inefficiently, it may be possible to institutionalize methods to screen out the ineffiecient use of arbitration while still inviting its efficient use.
What follows is a description of a study that was conducted to determine
the extent to which inefficient use is being made of the arbitration process
offered by the securities industry. After a discussion of the finding of the
study, this paper will offer several proposals to avoid inefficient use of the arbitration mechanism while still providing parties with a cost-effective dispute
resolution system that promotes confidence in the fairness of the securities
industry.
III.

TIMELINESS

The need to investigate potential inefficient use of arbitration in the securities industry is particularly relevant today. The use of arbitration as a mechanism to resolve broker/customer disputes has risen dramatically in recent
years. In 1983,1 the NASD received 552 new regular 10 claims, 23 percent
more than the new regular claims received in 1982. From 1981 to 1982, the
growth in these new cases for the NASD was 60 percent, and from 1980 to
1981 it was 52 percent. For the New York Stock Exchange, the comparable
figures for growth was 28,5 percent from 1982 to 1983 (when new regular
cases received went from 449 to 577), 22 percent from 1981 to 1982, and 55.5
percent from 1980 to 1981. Not all new cases ultimately end up before an
8. For purposes of further discussion in this paper, using arbitration for resolving disputes which disputes may be as readily resolved by less expensive methods
(which also instill investor confidence in the securities industry) shall be considered an
"inefficient" use of arbitration. Clearly there might be concerns external to the resolution of actual disputes (e.g., regulatory concerns, member-firm relation concerns among
others) which would favor a resolution mechanism such as arbitration. These concerns
are outside of the scope of this study.
9. The statistical information that follows regarding the growth in the use of
arbitration was made available to the author by the Director of Arbitration of the New
York Stock Exchange. It includes information that was prepared for a 1984 meeting of
the Securities Industry Conference on Arbitration.
10. Regular claims will be distinguished from small claims of less than $2500
which pursuant to the Uniform Code of Arbitration Procedure need not require a hearing and may be decided by a single arbitrator on the basis of written submissions of the
claimant and respondent. See NASD Code of Arbitration Procedure (adopted effective
November I, 1968, amended effective July 21, 1980) Section 13 [Hereinafter CAP].
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol1985/iss/10
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arbitration panel because significant numbers of cases are settled prior to
hearing and others are withdrawn. However, the number of cases adjudicated
by arbitrators is similarly rising. Arbitrators for the New York Stock Exchange rendered 331 awards in 1983, compared with only 154 in 1980; a 115
percent increase within a four-year period.
The costs associated with conducting an arbitration hearing vary with the
amount claimed, the location of the hearing, the use or non-use of attorney
representatives, and other factors. Broadly speaking, there are a number of
categories of expenses which will have an impact on the overall expense of
each arbitration. First, the administrative time expended by staff attorneys
and support staff of the respective SRO in arranging for the hearing, conducting the hearing, preparing the documentation of the award, and responding to inquiries by the parties to the arbitration. Hearings are conducted by
between three and five arbitrators.'1 Each arbitrator is partially compensated
with a small honorarium from the respective SRO; that portion of his or her
time which is not compensated by the honorarium is donated as a public service. If the parties are represented by attorneys, the attorneys' fees become a
cost of conducting an arbitration. Finally, the lost business time of the parties
is included in the cost of conducting an arbitration.
IV.

METHODOLOGY

The goals of the study were to examine the nature of the use that is being
made of the arbitration system. Much of the information sought was objective
in nature, including: the dollar amount of the claim, whether the representation was pro se, the facts giving rise to the claim, and the number of communications of the parties prior to the filing of claim and prior to the hearing.
The study also sought more subjective information in order to evaluate the
legitimacy of the legal theory, the sufficiency of the complaint and the response in providing an adequate explanation of the parties' arguments, and
whether other mechanisms might have provided a satisfactory resolution of the
dispute if they had been available.
For much of the subjective information and even for a portion of the objective information, 12 a personal assessment of facts needed to be rendered by
I1. The number of arbitrators at a hearing depends upon the dollar amount of
the claim in dispute. Small claims of $2500 or less may be heard by a single arbitrator
but not more than three arbitrators. Although a hearing is not required for small
claims of under $2500, the arbitrator assigned to such claims may request a hearing.
CAP §13. Claims of between $2500 and $100,000 may be heard by a panel of between
three and five arbitrators. Claims of over $100,000 require a panel of five arbitrators.
CAP §19.

12. Some of the "objective" information required a subjective evaluation. As an
example, since claimants do not necessarily specify the legal theory under which they
are proceding, an assessment had to be made by the interviewee regarding the nature
of the theory of claimant's case.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1985
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someone familiar with specific arbitrated matters. Probably every individual
who is familiar with a particular arbitration matter would have his or her own
criteria to evaluate the subjective and even some of the objective questions for
which information was sought. Of the possible candidates to evaluate an arbitration, the staff attorney of the SRO that conducted the arbitration1" typically has a relatively neutral perception. There is no a priori reason for the
staff attorney to share potential biases of either claimant or respondent and
the breadth of experience of the staff attorney would typically provide him
with a broad spectrum of experience against which to evaluate the facts of a
particular arbitrated matter.'
Since the questions of this study were presented orally, I attempted to
provide the staff attorneys with similar criteria by which to evaluate the questions and offer answers. Questions were frequently rephrased or explained in
depth when it appeared that there was uncertainty about the evaluation or
when the criteria employed seemed to be dissimilar to the criteria employed by
other respondents.
Staff attorneys were asked to refamiliarize themselves with the files of the
five"6 most recent broker/customer disputes which had gone to hearing for
which they had been responsible and for which an award had been rendered.
They were informed in advance of the nature of the information sought. A
total of eleven attorneys at two SRO's (the New York Stock Exchange and
the National Association of Securities Dealers) were interviewed in person or
by phone. Responses for fifteen categories of objective and evaluative information was sought. When a subjective evaluation was required, the staff-attorney
was sometimes given a spectrum of five answers ranging from a strong negative to a strong positive from which to respond; other times, a straight "yes" or
13. Each case which is received into arbitration by an SRO, is ushered through
the arbitration proceedings by a staff attorney. The staff attorney is also usually the
only party who is familiar with the case from its inception to its conclusion. The staff
attorney receives all communication directed to the SRO and all documentation relevant to the hearing. The staff attorney officiates at the hearing, frequently provides
informal procedural advice to the arbitrators and ultimately prepares the award that is
agreed upon by the arbitrators. The staff attorney also fields any post-hearing
problems.
14. Other individuals who might be familiar with particular arbitration matters
would include parties to such arbitrations, attorneys representing such parties as well
as the arbitrators. The parties and their attorneys would seemingly have an investment
in perceiving the arbitration in a manner consonant with their respective positions. The
arbitrators also have an investment in perceiving the arbitration in a manner that reflects favorably upon the role the arbitrator played. The staff attorney does not appear
to be subjected to these built-in biases.
15. The staff attorneys were asked to employ no selection factors other than
choosing the five most recent matters for which an award had been made. Since the
interviews were conducted during the summer of 1984, most of the cases reported upon
went to hearing in the first half of 1984.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol1985/iss/10
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"no" evaluation was sought. Information was collected both in the form of
specific responses to the questions posed as well as in the form of anecdotes
and general impressions. 6 Responses were gathered regarding forty-one matters which had gone to hearing and for which an award had been determined.
The number of cases for which information was gathered is probably not
large enough to insure statistical accuracy of the results. The statistics are
presented for their possible suggestive value; they should be broadly indicative
of the direction in which a larger sample would lean. The anecdotal information gathered identifies perceptions and provides insights valuable to a study of
an arbitration system.
V.

FINDINGS

Some general observations may be made of the characteristics of the
cases studied. The observations summarize the information gathered regarding
(i) the nature of the dispute; (ii) the parties' presentation of their positions;
(iii) the conduct of the hearing; (iv) awards made; and (v) broker operational
problems.
(I) Of the forty-one cases brought, twenty-one cases were based at least
in part on a contract claim, nineteen on a breach of fiduciary duty, and nine
on a fraud claim. The total is greater than forty-one because some cases had
more than one theory of recovery.
(2) Twenty cases were for claims of less than $10,000. An additional
eighteen cases were for claims between $10,000 and $99,000. Two claims were
for amounts of greater than $100,000, and the claim of one case was
unspecified.
(3) Eighteen of the forty-one claimants, or forty-four percent, brought
their claim in a pro se capacity. 7 Only 12 of the respondents or twenty-nine
percent, were not represented by attorneys. In a total of twenty-three of the
cases, at least one party was pro se represented.
(4) Of the twenty cases where the claims were less than $10,000, twelve
of the claimants were pro se. However, of the twenty cases in which the claims
were greater than $10,000, only five of the claimants were pro se. In other
16. Some questions typically evoked extended response. For example, one question was intended to determine whether the staff attorney believed a particular matter
should have gone to hearing. Usually, the question was asked as follows, "Did the parties really have to go to arbitration? Are there means that might not have been available, but, if available and if utilized, would have made a hearing unnecessary?" Frequently a question of this sort stimulated a request from the interviewee for further
explanation and, at times, prompted an expression of dispute resolution philosophy
which would provide insights beyond those provided by the specifically requested
information.
17. Two additional claimants were pro se, but since they also were attorneys,
they were not included in the pro se category.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1985
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words, claimants were more than twice as likely to be bringing the claims in a
pro se capacity if the dollar amount of their claims was under $10,000 than if
it was over $10,000. From the information gathered, it was impossible to determine whether claimants are more likely to seek the services of an attorney
because the large dollar amount of their claim, or if claimants are stimulated
to seek higher awards only after they retain the services of an attorney.
(5) Questions were asked of the interviewees to ascertain the instances in
which the parties attempted to communicate with one another prior to the
filing of the complaint and/or prior to the hearing. Unfortunately, there is
often no occasion to note inter-party communication efforts in the arbitration
record. At times, the record notes a failure, or alleged failure, of the respondent to make a good faith reply to a customer's complaint. In eleven cases, the
respondent was characterized as having either not replied, replied in a perfunctory manner, replied without a good faith investigation, or replied in an
unproductive hostile manner. Totally discounting the cases for which the record is unclear about the respondent's reply, in over one quarter of the cases the
respondent's reply was not characterized in a manner suggesting a good faith
effort at communication with the claimant.
(6) Twenty-one of the forty-one cases were evaluated as being conducted
in a somewhat informal manner. The interviewees were advised that the question regarding "informality" was seeking an evaluation of (i) whether the arbitration was conducted in a manner which followed court room procedure and
(ii) whether the parties presented their own cases or were assisted in their
presentation by the arbitrators.
In all but three instances (three out of twenty-three), if one of the parties
was pro se represented, the hearing was conducted in a manner evaluated either as very informal or fairly informal. Contrariwise, in all but one instance
(one out of eighteen) if both parties were either attorney represented or were
themselves attorneys, the hearing was conducted in a manner that was evaluated as being either very formal, fairly formal, or average formal. These two
observations indicate that arbitration hearings with one or more pro se parties
are conducted more informally than arbitrator hearings in which both parties
are represented by attorneys or are themselves attorneys.
(7) Five complaints were perceived as either fairly insufficient or very insufficient as a basis for establishing the nature of the complaint and seven
responses were perceived as fairly or very insufficient as a basis for establishing the nature of the response. In all but three instances, the claimant's evidence presentation was perceived as sufficient to establish a case and in all but
six instances, the respondents presentation of evidence was perceived as
sufficient.
(8) In sixteen of the forty-one cases, one or more of the parties or their
representatives were perceived as being either fairly hostile or very hostile at
the hearing.
(9) In eighteen of the forty-one cases, there was no monetary award. In
sixteen instances, the claim was dismissed, in one instance the claimant was
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol1985/iss/10
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collaterally estopped, and in one instance, the claimant won but received no
award. Of the twenty-two instances where monetary awards were provided,
four of the awards amounted to ten percent or less of the claim amount, three
of the awards were for between ten percent and forty percent of the claim
amount, ten of the awards were for between forty percent and sixty percent of
the claim amount, one award was for between sixty percent and ninety-nine of
the claim amount, and four awards were for the entire claim amount. In fiftyfive percent of the cases in which a monetary award was provided, the award
was close (within ten percent) to being half of the amount claimed.
(10) In twelve instances, broker operational problems which did not rise
to a level requiring disciplinary action, but which did help create the customer's perceived problem and with which the brokerage firm was not necessarily aware were identified by the interviewee.
In addition to the information summarized above relating primarily to the
nature of the complaint and the conduct of the arbitration procedure the interviewees were asked evaluative questions regarding the validity of the claim
and the propriety of utilizing arbitration to resolve it. The responses to these
evaluative questions are summarized below. Although some of the information
sought in these instances was quite subjective, many of the interviewees have
had a broad range of experience upon which to base such evaluations. An
evaluation that a matter might have been handled more efficiently by means
other than an arbitration hearing would not have been made in the abstract;
but, rather within the context of other arbitration experiences. Other information sought, however, was less subjective. If a claimant failed to mitigate damages, but still sought full compensation for harm suffered, it was not an extremely subjective determination that the claimant's case was not well founded
in law.
(1) In eight matters the claimant's case was evaluated as not possessing
arguments based upon a valid legal theory. In an additional four instances, an
evaluation was made that a portion of claimant's case was not based upon a
valid legal theory. This would include situations such as where a plaintiff had
a legitimate cause of action, but proposed a damage remedy which could not
be provided at law. For example, the dollar amount of some claims, included a
request for punitive damages even though arbitrators are not often permitted
to award punitive damages. 8
18. "[P]unitive damages may not be awarded by the arbitrator, even if the parties have agreed upon giving the arbitrator the authority to do so." M. DOMKE, DOMKE
ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 445 (Rev. Ed. M. Wilner 1984) [hereinafter cited as
DOMKE ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION]. Domke cites as authority for his proposition,
Garrity v. Lyle Stuart, Inc., 40 N.Y.2d 354, 353 N.E.2d 793, 386 N.Y.S.2d 831
(1976).
However, some courts have permitted the awarding of punitive damages. In the
instance of a labor law arbitration, a federal district court in Wisconsin permitted punitive damages when an agreement "contain[ed] no specific provision on the subject of
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1985
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(2) In twelve of the forty-one matters, the staff attorney indicated that he
or she believed that means other than arbitration, were they available, might
have been used to more efficiently resolve the dispute. In an additional four
matters, the interviewee believed that some of the matters brought to arbitration might have even more efficiently resolved in part were means other than
arbitrations available. In nine of those twelve instances, the staff attorney suggested that additional communication between the parties might have resolved
the issue prior to the hearing. The suggestion was often made that one party
was unaware on another's position and that additional communications could
have given the parties insights which would have stimulated settlement. In
three of the twelve instances, either the claimant's or respondent's position
could have been made clearer in either written communications or the actual
complaint or response. In four instances, the staff attorney believed that had a
party been more familiar with the law, the issue would not have been arbitrated. In one instance'", the claimant was characterized as having gone to
arbitration to settle his claims because he had not prepared his case. However,
this case involved a claimant's failure to mitigate damages, suggesting that the
interviewee perceived this matter as a further instance of a party using arbitration because of a lack of familiarity with the law.
(3) In twelve instances the staff attorney described a fact pattern which
could be characterized as a good faith disagreement on the facts or the law. In
ten additional instances, the attorneys believed the parties went to arbitration
because one or both parties were being intransigent or were stonewalling."
The terms "intransigence" and "stonewalling", were frequently used by the
interviewees. In other instances, I supplied these terms to summarize a fact
pattern described by the interviewee in which one or more of the parties ignored the legitimacy of his or her position and rather insisted upon proceeding
to arbitration.
In two instances, the staff attorney believed a matter went to arbitration
because of the adversarial character of the attorney who had been retained by
one of the parties. In an additional case, the staff attorney believed a matter
went to hearing because the attorney was attempting to compensate for an
earlier error in representing the client.
remedies." Sheetmetal Workers Int'l Association v. Helgesteel Corp., 335 F. Supp.
812, 815 (C.D. Wisc. 1971).
19. The total number of explanations exceeds the total number of instances in
which arbitration was judged as not necessary in whole or part because, in some instances, two different reasons explain the interviewee's evaluation.
20. A pattern of stonewalling was considered by the interviewees to be an explanation both as to why a matter needed to go to arbitration as well as why arbitration
could be avoided. Assumedly, in the first instance, it was felt that the party could not
be persuaded to discontinue stonewalling. In the second instance, an evaluation was
assumedly made that perhaps the party could be dissuaded from stonewalling in order
to avoid having the matter going to arbitration.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol1985/iss/10
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In one instance, the claimant was evaluated as wanting more than what
his 'or her case was worth. This evaluation could suggest either a good faith
belief in one's position or intransigence; therefore, it was not included in either
category.
Finally, one claimant was evaluated as too hostile to settle without an
arbitration. Again, because this too could be categorized as either intrasigence
or as a good faith belief in one's position, it was not included in either
category.
(4) The following summary can be derived: In a total of twenty-four
cases, the staff attorney evaluated one or both of the parties as either lacking
knowledge about the relevant law, needing more communication with the opposing party, acting intransigently, or being unprepared.
(5) In four of forty-one cases, the staff attorney perceived the award
granted as in some way "unreasonable." Unreasonableness was measured by
the size of the award compared to the merits and presentation of the claimants
case and the harm the claimant allegedly experienced.
VI.

CONCERNS IDENTIFIED

In twelve of the forty-one cases which were arbitrated, the dispute between the parties can perhaps be characterized as a "good faith dispute." A
good faith dispute would include a basic disagreement as to the facts or the
law which required the interposition of a neutral third party for resolution.
In twenty-three cases, the behavior of the parties can be categorized as
"other-than-good-faith behavior" and the disputes as "other-than-good-faith
disputes." They are designated "other-than-good-faith disputes" because the
genesis of the dispute is perceived as something other than a bona fide disagreement regarding facts or law not because the parties are somehow not in
contention. "Other-than-good-faith-disputes" include disputes that persist because one or both of the parties did not have an accurate understanding of the
relevant law; one or both of the parties refrained from engaging in other than
perfunctory communication with the opposing party or the respondent refrained from conducting a good faith investigation of the problem leading to
the dispute; or one or both of the parties was committed to intransigence regardless of the validity of his position.
If there were mechanisms available to counter other-than-good-faith behavior, then the number of matters actually going to hearing might be considerably reduced. The countering mechanism or mechanisms would have to respond to different behavior in each one of the above categories. In
controversies where parties engaged the arbitration system in part because
they were unfamiliar with the law, the mechanism to counter the other-thangood-faith behavior would have to educate parties as to the law. In controversies in which the respondent refused to investigate the behavior of its employees or engage in other than perfunctory communication with the opposing
party, the countering mechanism would have to foster self-investigation and
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1985
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meaningful communication. For parties who go to arbitration partially because
of intransigence or stubbornness, a behavior countering mechanism would
have to encourage settlement efforts or at least negotiations, but this behavior
is probably the most difficult to alter. All three categories of other-than-goodfaith behavior, however, could be susceptible to certain efforts at alteration.
VII.

MECHANISMS TO COUNTER OTHER-THAN-GOOD-FAITH BEHAVIOR

The proposed mechanisms are designed to respond to a number of the
problems that were identified during the interviews. They are intended as suggestions for further discussion. While the proposals might resolve some
problems, they may create new ones. Hopefully, this article will generate further discussions about what other alternatives are available and/or how the
below proposals might be refined.
A.

Invalid Legal Theories

In twelve instances (29% of the cases studied) all or a portion of claimant's case was based upon what the staff attorney perceived to an invalid legal
theory. In six of those cases (50% of the time) the claimant was either represented by a lawyer or was himself an attorney. Thus, failure to base a case on
a valid legal claim is not limited to pro se actions.
In these cases, if the claimants or their attorneys were informed, prior to
the arbitration hearing, that their claim does not appear to be based upon a
valid legal theory, then some percentage of such claimants might well desist in
proceeding further in the arbitration process. A second percentage might aggressively seek a settlement. A third portion, however, might want to proceed
regardless of the legitimacy of the legal claim. This third group might want to
proceed for a number of reasons. Some might doubt the advice or believe that
a panel of arbitrators might have a different view regarding the validity of the
claim. Others might understand that arbitrators are not strictly bound by legal
precedents in their deliberations."' Finally, some might want to proceed
merely to compel the respondent to incur the expense or inconvenience of defending himself. In fact a number of interviewees provided anecdotal information describing claimants who engaged the arbitration mechanism as a means
of "punishing" the respondent broker.
It would be impossible to predict what percentage of the claimants would
not proceed further with the arbitration process if they learned that their
claims were probably devoid of a valid legal theory. However, merely dissuading claimants from proceeding to arbitration would not be an effective counter
to the other-than-good-faith behavior of bringing invalid legal claims to hearing unless the countering procedure allowed the claimant to maintain confidence in the dispute resolution system as a whole. The claimant would have to
21.

DOMKE ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, supra note
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trust the advice given, have confidence in the impartiality of the source, and
understand that arbitration would still be available if that path were chosen. It
might be advisable to include with any evaluation suggesting a lack of validity
of legal theory disclaimers regarding the lack of universality of the evaluation
and the fact that arbitrators are not strictly bound by legal precedent. Further,
claimants might be advised that some claimants have received monetary
awards in spite of an evaluation that their claim was without legal merit.
Advice could be given regarding specific operations of the securities industry. The case samples suggest that claimants are frequently unaware of
how execution reports are generated. Anecdotal information indicated that
some claimants did not understand how a stop order operates. Other accounts
described a lack of familiarity with the "pink sheets." It is possible that a
number of disputes would dissipate if information regarding these industry
practices was provided to parties (typically the claimant).
The hard question obviously is how and by whom is the claimant to be
advised about the validity of the underlying legal theory of his or her case. At
some point after the filing of submissions and before a hearing date is set, a
party in the role of a neutral attorney-advisor could be introduced into the
arbitration process. This role might well be assumed by the staff-attorney who
presently shepherds the cases to arbitration and who, on occasion, already fills
the attorney-advisor role.2" To some extent this role would require a redefinition of the staff attorney's position in regard to both the SRO and to the parties to the arbitration. Alternatively, an attorney-advisor might be added to
staff by the SRO, perhaps outside of the specific structure of the arbitration
office, to review arbitration cases which are destined for hearings. In either
instance the attorney-advisor service could be provided by the SRO.
One concern with interjecting an attorney-adivsor into the arbitration
process might be the difficulty in determining a priori which parties require
such advice and which do not. An attorney-advisor's services could be offered
to all parties who request such assistance. Alternatively, such a service could
be interjected as an automatic review procedure for all controversies after the
completion of the parties' written submissions. If the review procedure were
automatic for all controversies, it might well be conducted by the staff-attor22. Anecdotal information gathered from a number of staff attorneys suggests
that they at times already play the role of attorney-advisor. One staff attorney provided
an account of a case that had arisen in part as a result of a prospective claimant's lack
of familiarity with stop orders. The attorney-advisor provided the prospective claimant
with a pamphlet explaining stop orders and suggested that the customer read the pamphlet. The attorney advised the customer that if he wanted to still file a claim after
reading the pamphlet, he should do so. The attorney reported that after reading the
pamphlet, the customer was so "satisfied" that he offered to take the attorney out to
lunch.
Another staff attorney indicated that she frequently has to explain terms and procedures to pro se claimants. Thus, in some situations and to some extent, she already
conducts herself as an attorney advisor.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1985
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ney responsible for the particular matter.
The review procedure could also be expanded to include more than just
an analysis of the legitimacy of the legal theory of the case or an explanation
of specific securities industry operations. A total of twelve of the written submissions by claimants and respondents were perceived by the staff-attorneys as
insufficient for purposes of enabling a reader to determine the nature of either
the complaint or the response. Lack of clear submissions frequently leads to
lengthy arbitration hearings, less effective hearings, and perhaps fewer settlements prior to hearing. Part of the attorney-advisor's role might be to provide
claimants and respondents with an outline of how to prepare a submission
(e.g., statement of issue, summary of facts, implication of facts for issue, etc.).
The attorney-advisor might review the submissions for adequacy of information. As with the review for legal sufficiency, any advice would be in the form
of a suggestion and the party would be advised that a decision to ignore the
advice would not affect the party's ability to proceed with the arbitration.
Another concern regarding the introduction of an attorney-advisor function is that it might suggest an appearance of SRO partiality in a situation
where it is essential for the SRO to be perceived by both parties as completely
unbiased. Concerns were raised during the study by some interviewees regarding the appearance created by an SRO-whose members are all securities industry firms-advising a customer/claimant (who seeks to utilize the SRO's
dispute resolution facilities) that his claim lacks legal substance. Many SRO
staff attorneys feared that some claimants would take such advice as other
than neutral and that SRO member-firms might find it difficult to accept SRO
personnel advising customers on how best to present a claim against a member
firm.
These concerns are at least in part exaggerated. In essence, the SRO is
already providing assistance to parties in the presentation of their cases. In the
vast majority (20 of 23) of matters in which one or more parties was pro se,
arbitrators conducted the hearing in a manner that was characterized as less
formal than if none of the parties were pro se (where only one of eighteen
hearings was characterized as informal)."3 This informality typically includes
lending assistance to the pro se party(ies). The propriety of such assistance
has not been questioned and the arbitrators are still perceived of as neutral
and not as agents of the SRO's or the member-firms. Possibly, a similar perception either presently exists or could be created about the role of the staff
attorney. Hopefully, this kind of neutral role could also be created for an attorney-advisor if that position is separated from the staff attorney's function.
Finally, there are potential concerns with the conflict created by an attorney-advisor giving advice to opposing parties in an arbitration proceeding.
However, the general rule of professional operation is that if the attorney be23. One staff attorney who appeared to oppose the concept of an attorney advisor indicated that as a general procedure, he advises arbitrators to lend assistance to
pro se parties.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol1985/iss/10
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lieves he can competently advise both parties and discloses his dual role to
each, acceptance of the services after disclosure extinguishes the potential im24
propriety. Both the recently adopted Model Rules of Professional Conduct
and the Code of Professional Responsibility2 5 deem it acceptable for attorneys
to advise clients in conflict situations so long as the clients knowingly consent
to such representation and the attorney does not believe his dual relationship
adversely affects either party.26
In summary, the introduction of an attorney-advisor to the pre-hearing
procedures of the arbitration process may well provide a mechanism for dissuading parties without valid legal claims from proceeding to an arbitration
hearing while still preserving confidence in the arbitration system. In addition,
an attorney-advisor might assist in assuring that party submissions convey adequate information to opposing parties regarding the nature of claimants' and
respondents' positions. The development of an attorney-advisor position, however, may require alterations in our present perception of the SRO's role in the
preparation of the arbitration matter.
B.

Communication Failures and Failures to Conduct Good Faith
Investigations

In evaluating the efforts of the parties to the arbitration to communicate
with one another, in eleven instances, the interviewees characterized the respondents' communications with the claimant and the respondent's investigation of the facts giving rise to the controversy as not in good faith, perfunctory,
hostile, non-existent, or otherwise inadequate. The interviewees indicated that,
in ten of the forty-one cases sampled, the failure of the parties to communicate
or to communicate in good faith at least in part compelled the arbitration. The
failure to communicate was typically the fault of the respondent rather than
27
the claimant.
Failure to communicate and other-than-good-faith behavior appears to
discourage settlement and provokes hostility. In ten of the fourteen instances
in which claimant or claimant's attorney appeared hostile at the hearing, there
was either no recorded history of communication by the respondent to the
claimant (four cases) or the communication was inadequate or hostile (six
cases). A broker who engages in meaningful communication with the claimant
demonstrates a certain amount of concern for his customer's problems. In
See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7.
25. See Model Code of Professional Responsibility DR 5-105(c).
26. For a discussion of the potential conflicts of attorneys serving dual roles in
dispute resolution processes and resolutions to these conflicts, see, J. FOLBERG, A. TAY24.

LOR, MEDIATION,

IGATION

A

COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO RESOLVING CONFLICTS WITHOUT LIT-

Chapter 10, at 244-290 (1984).

27. Anecdotal information gathered from three interviewees described instances
in which brokerage firms appeared to have decided not to participate in pre-hearing
interaction with the claimant.
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some situations, this demonstration of concern, even with no concomitant offer
of settlement might satisfy a claimant's desire for attention to his problem.
Good faith communication by the respondent might convince a claimant
that his claim is without merit, thereby promoting settlement. In other instances, a good faith examination of the facts leading up to the controversy
might reveal to a respondent that a claimant's concerns are meritorious.
Whether as a means to defuse claimant's outrage or to encourage settlement,
good faith analysis of the problem and communication of such analysis would
seem to be a sensible method of reducing the number of arbitration hearings.
One approach to insuring good faith analysis and communication by brokers would be the adoption of an SRO rule requiring brokerage firms subject
to an arbitration claim to conduct a good faith examination of the facts leading to the filing and to convey the results to the claimants. Although it would
be difficult, if not impossible, to determine in advance what would constitute a
good faith examination, such a rule would establish an expectation that a
manager would do more than merely ask the registered representative (broker)
who had contact with the customer if he agreed with the customer's complaint. The manager would be expected to piece together the relevant facts.
Where appropriate, telephone logs, execution records, account statements,
cross-reference cards, compliance records, research reports and other records
should be examined. After the facts have been examined, the brokerage firm
manager should discuss both the facts and the relevant customs and practices
of the industry with the claimant.
The notion of requiring a good faith examination is not particularly innovative nor impractical. In an analogous situation, credit card issuers are required pursuant to Truth in Lending Regulations to respond to written notification of billing errors with a
written explanation or clarification to the customer, after having conducted a
reasonable investigation, setting forth, to the extent applicable, the reasons
why the creditor believes the amount(s) was correctly shown on the periodic
statement and, if the customer so requests, furnishing copies of documentary
evidence of the customer's indebtedness with respect to the alleged billing
error(s) .28
Failure of a credit card issuer to adequately investigate could lead to forfeiture of part of the disputed error.29
The specifics of a good faith investigation rule would obviously be the
subject of considerable debate. The spirit of such a rule, however would be to
encourage resolution of customer complaints by means short of an arbitration
hearing.
28.
29.

12 CFR 226.13(F) (commonly referred to as Regulation Z).
Section 161(e) of the Fair Credit Billing Act, 15 USC § 1666.
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C.

Intransigence

Perhaps the most difficult other-than-good-faith behavior to eliminate is
party intransigence. In ten of the forty-one case samples, one or more of the
parties was viewed either as intransigent or as stonewalling the other party.
Intransigence frequently cannot be distinguished from the other identified categories of other-than-good-faith behavior. Identifying intransigence as otherthan-good-faith behavior does not suggest that arbitration cannot or should
not be used to resolve disputes arising out of or maintained by such behavior.
The characterization merely implies that the dispute is not generated by a
bona fide disagreement over facts or law. The cause of disputes arising from or
maintained by intransigence is the unwillingness of at least one party to objectively examine and construct reasonable conclusions from available factual or
legal information. Intransigence gives rise to a dispute that does indeed require
an outside party for resolution, but the dispute is not generated by a bona fide
disagreement regarding facts or law. In these instances arbitration becomes a
substitute for the party's(ies') self-evaluation of the merits of the controversy.
If the intransigent party(ies) could be persuaded to conduct an objective examination of the available facts and law and to construct reasonable conclusions, then the need to arbitrate the dispute might dissipate. The obvious question is how does one compel good faith examinations of information and the
construction of reasonable conclusions?
The use of a mediation mechanism is frequently cited as a means to persuade the parties to conduct an objective evaluation of facts and law, draw
reasonable conclusions, and consider settlement. In fact, when the Securities
Exchange Commission's Office of Consumer Affairs made its initial proposals
for a dispute resolution system, it suggested that participation by the parties in
"nonbinding, informal mediation" be a "condition precedent to formal
arbitration." 30
The term "mediation" means different things to different people. The
seminal article on mediation by Professor Lon Fuller3 l describes mediation as
the interposition of a neutral third party, who reasons with the parties. The
mediator has no authority to compel settlements or grant awards, rather, the
parties re-examine their attitudes and alter their positions in order to ultimately achieve a settlement which each side can find acceptable through discussions with the mediator.
Traditionally, mediation is employed primarily where the parties are in a
continuing relationship, such as an employer/employee relationship, in which
each is dependent upon one another. Consequently, each is motivated to find a
satisfactory solution to their common dispute so that the relationship may sur30. Securities Exchange Act Rel. No. 12974 (November 15, 1976).
31. Fuller, Mediation-Its Forms and Functions, 44 So. CAL. L. REV. 305
(1971).
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vive. 3 2 The parties have a built-in motivation for redirecting their attitudes
toward one another.
In securities industry disputes, there generally is no continuing relationship; therefore, traditional mediation would be largely impractical. The broker
and customer have typically terminated their business relationship and there is
no motivation to resolve their conflicts in order to preserve interpersonal harmony. Generally, each party to a securities industry arbitration dispute is
seeking to "win" the dispute at the sake of his or her opponent's losing the
dispute.3 3 Securities industry disputes are not analogous to labor/management
disputes, marital disputes or landlord/tenant for which there generally is considerable motivation for mutually satisfying settlements and for which traditional mediation is a viable dispute resolution mechanism.
In addition, traditional mediation would probably require an expenditure
of resources at least as great as would arbitration. Even with this expenditure
of resources, there would be no guarantee of a resolution of the dispute as is
guaranteed in arbitration. In traditional mediation, the parties typically would
first meet separately with the mediator and then jointly. 4 Although there
might be a decrease in use of attorneys in mediation, the claimant, respondent,
and SRO staff would probably spend more time in the dispute resolution proceedings than they would spend in arbitration.
Although traditional mediation might be an impractical means of responding to party intransigence in the arbitration process, there are conciliation elements of the mediation process that could be utilized within the present
arbitration procedure to help discourage party intransigence and encourage
settlements.
The proposal made above to advise parties when their claims are not
based upon valid legal theories would in essence incorporate a mediation conciliation method. The attorney-advisor (or staff attorney) who adivses the
party of his or her invalid legal claim would be functioning in part as a mediator. The advice presented to the party would be presented with the hope of
32. Id. at 310. ("The two parties are locked in a relationship that is virtually
one of 'bilateral monopoly;' each is dependent for its very existence on some collaboration with the other."); Eisenberg, Private Ordering Through Negotiation: Dispute-Settlement and Rulemaking, 89 HARv. L. REV. 637, 649 (1976) ("In cases where the
disputants place a premium on the continuance of an ongoing relationship, the element
of reconciliation is likely to provide each disputant with an incentive to give some
weight to his opponent's good faith claim or defense .... ").
33. For mediation to work, "[tihe parties need commitment to non-adversarial
resolution, and willingness not to have a winner or a loser. Mutual satisfaction is the
goal of the mediation session." Meacham, Internal, External and Public-Agency; The
Use of Mediation to Resolve Employment Discrimination Complaints (1983) (An unpublished paper prepared for the First National Conference on Resolving EEO Disputes Without Litigation on file with the National Institute for Dispute Resolution,
Washington, D.C.).
34. Fuller, supra note 31, at 322-23.
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moving that party closer to settlement by encouraging a re-evaluation of his or
her own position in light of the new understanding of the appropriate legal
precedent.
Additional elements of mediation, deliberately designed to bring the parties together and to discourage intransigence, could be institutionally incorporated in the present arbitration system. Anecdotal accounts provided by several staff attorneys indicate that there are at present situations in which the
staff attorneys urge the parties jointly to reconsider their positions and to attempt to settle their disputes prior to the arbitration hearing. One staff attorney indicated that he urges a settlement prior to a hearing only when he is
working on cases in which both parties are represented by attorneys. Another
staff attorney suggested that he is willing to "knock heads" to some extent
when the dispute is not a customer/broker dispute but rather a dispute between two member brokerage firms.
When dealing exclusively with lawyers or brokers, it seems that some
staff attorneys are willing to urge settlement without fear of being perceived as
partial, but when dealing with customers, staff attorneys are reluctant to advise the customer to reach a settlement. This reluctance appears to arise out of
a concern of appearing impartial. The staff attorney's concern with appearing
impartial varies considerably depending on the background and expectations
of the parties with whom he is dealing. The staff attorney expects that attorneys representing parties in disputes anticipate and are familiar with settlement pressure. Similarly, brokers in dispute are perceived as being familiar
with the need to reach settlement and are not expected to view settlement
pressure as partial advice.
Party expectations make settlement advice acceptable in some fact situations (broker/broker disputes and negotiations with attorney representatives),
but not in other instances (broker/customer disputes where negotiations are
not conducted with attorneys). Perhaps party expectations can be institutionally altered. If both customers and brokers were advised at the time of filing of
submissions that it is the responsibility of the staff attorney to urge settlements
prior to hearings, such settlement advice might not carry with it a risk of
appearing partial. As part of the pre-hearing procedures, staff attorneys could
arrange for conference telephone calls between parties to explore the opportunities for settlement and to attempt to counter party intransigence. At present,
there appears to be no institutionalized procedures that jointly assist the parties in settlement efforts after filing of submissions and prior to hearings. Concerns with the appearance of partiality should not override legitimate efforts to
reconcile disputes by mechanisms other than formal hearings.
If staff attorney involvement in pre-hearing conciliation efforts in order to
discourage intransigence and encourage settlement is accepted, then the specific conciliation efforts the staff attorney might employ must be determined.
The staff attorney might informally gather facts by telephone conversations.
As suggested above, the staff attorney might arrange conference calls to discuss settlement. The staff attorney might even offer an opinion as to how the
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1985
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matter might be resolved if it goes to arbitration.35 The formation of such
opinion could be assisted by the preparation of statistical data regarding the
typical size and distribution of awards. If the dispute is not resolved in the
informal discussions, the parties would not be permitted to use any settlement
offers as evidence during the arbitration. There could be considerable flexibility employed in integrating conciliation efforts with the present activities of
the staff attorney. The major hurdle facing the SRO's would be to decide to
institutionalize staff-attorney conciliation efforts.
Finally, it must be recognized that a certain amount of party intransigence will always be a part of any dispute resolution system. Parties at times
engage the arbitration systems in order to harrass broker/respondents and occasionally respondents perceive stonewalling as a way to discourage customer/
claimants. For these parties, perhaps no amount of conciliation efforts will promote good faith examination of the merits of their cases. These parties seek to
engage the arbitration process; this engagement is satisfying in and of itself
either because it allows them to punish their opposing party or because it provides them with a day in court.
D.

Broker OperationalProblems Not Rising to the Level of Disciplinary
Violations

The proposals made above are each designed to reduce the arbitration
case load by screening out other-than-good-faith disputes. Another approach
to reducing the arbitration case load is to reduce matters that are brought to
arbitration by eliminating brokerage firm behavior which might generate
disputes.
In twelve matters in the case sample, brokerage firm operational
problems, which did not necessarily rise to the level of disciplinary problems
and of which the brokerage firm was not necessarily aware, were identified.
These operational problems included a registered representative's lack of
awareness of suitability obligations, confusing sales literature, and delays in
crediting accounts.
Presently, the arbitration system does not provide a mechanism for the
arbitrators to report to the respondent brokerage firm on operational deficiencies which might become apparent in the course of a hearing. Without information regarding such deficiencies, the brokerage firm might well continue to
conduct its operations in the manner giving rise to the dispute.
35. This approach of providing the parties with an advisory opinion as to how a
matter would be resolved were it to go to arbitration was employed with seemingly
considerable success in a labor grievance mediation experiment conducted in the coal
industry by two Northwestern University professors. Of 153 matters submitted to mediation in this experiment, only 17 matters went on to arbitration. Goldberg and Brett,
An Experiment in the Mediation of Grievances (1982) (An unpublished paper on file
with the National Institute for Dispute Resolution, Washington, D.C.).
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To benefit from the insights of the arbitrators, the SRO's might adopt a
procedure that would request oral comments from the arbitrators regarding
potential brokerage firm operational problems identified during the hearing.
These comments would be kept entirely separate from the arbitration award.
They would be transmitted to the brokerage firm as a method of improving
brokerage firm operations. They would not be available to claimants as a basis
for potential appeals. Further consideration would have to be given to how to
respond to arbitration reports which identified operational problems which did
rise to the level of disciplinary violations.
VIII.

CONCLUSION

Arbitration in the securities industry provides an efficient and expeditious
method of dispute resolution which instills confidence in the securities industry's dispute resolution process and in the securities industry itself. However,
as the number of matters going to arbitration, along with the corresponding
costs in providing the service, are increasing, questions arise regarding whether
some portion of the matters going to arbitration might be resolved by means
other than arbitration while still preserving confidence in the securities industry dispute resolution process.
In this study, a small case sample of controversies that were arbitrated by
the two SRO's with the largest arbitration staffs was examined. In a significant number of matters, it was perceived that controversies were going to arbitration in whole or in part because of reasons that could be characterized as
arising from other-than-good-faith disputes regarding either facts or law. In
some instances disputes went to arbitration because parties were unfamiliar
with the controlling law. In other instances, arbitration was engaged because
parties failed to communicate with one another in good faith or to examine the
fact situation generating the disputes. Finally, arbitration was sometimes utilized because of party intransigence, i.e., party unwillingness to examine the
merits of one's case. For discussion purposes, these three categories of disputes
were identified as "other-than-good-faith disputes."
After identifying controversies arising from other-than-good-faith disputes, this paper raised several suggestions for resolving these controversies for
discussion. The suggestions are intended as a means of generating further
thought and further discussion and not as final proposals. These suggestions
included: (i) integration of an attorney-advisor role in the pre-hearing procedures to advise parties as to invalid legal theories and to encourage preparation of informative submissions; (ii) adoption of SRO rules requiring brokerrespondents to institute reasonable investigations of facts which are the subject
of arbitration disputes and to engage in good faith communications with the
claimant to describe the results of such investigations; (iii) integration of conciliation efforts into the present pre-hearing procedures so that some institutionalized actions might be made to resolve disputes once papers are filed but
before the hearing is held; and (iv) creating of a confidential reporting mechaPublished by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1985
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nism of broker firm operational problems which come to light during arbitration hearings in order to help reduce future disputes.
In addition to the issues raised in this study, further investigations might
be conducted regarding other alternatives for resolving securities industry disputes. Many complaints are lodged with brokerage firms and with SRO's
which never result in arbitration filings. Are those customers satisfied by the
complaint processing procedures or do they get discouraged? If it is the former, then what can we learn from those complaint processing procedures that
might help resolve disputes that do go to arbitration? If it is the latter explanation, is that discouragement healthy for the industry? Does the cost to the
industry resulting from the discouragement of customers on pursuit of claims
exceed the cost to the industry that would result if such claims went to arbitration? Further, many controversies for which arbitration papers are filed are
resolved before the hearing. There is little information available regarding
what factors prompted settlements in these situations. Again, further investigations might provide useful ideas on how to assist parties in resolving other
controversies when the parties are not able to settle the dispute on their own.
The securities industry has provided its customers with an effective and
well regarded dispute resolution system. As this system is given increasingly
greater use, it becomes of increasingly greater interest to examine means of
further improving the present mechanisms.
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